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Abstract
In Côte d'Ivoire, as in much of Africa, husbands and wives farm different crops on separate plots.
These different crops are differentially sensitive to particular kinds of rainfall shocks. We find that
conditional on overall household expenditure, the composition of expenditure is sensitive to the gender of
the recipient of a rainfall shock. For example, rainfall shocks associated with high women's income shift
expenditure towards food. Social norms constrain the use of profits from yam cultivation, which is carried
out by men. Correspondingly, we find that rainfall-induced fluctuations in income from yams are transmitted
to expenditures on education and food, not to expenditures on private goods. We reject the hypothesis of
complete insurance within households, even with respect to publicly observable weather shocks. Different
sources of income are allocated to different uses depending upon both the identity of the income earner and
upon the origin of the income.
Keywords: Intra-household Allocation, Insurance, Social Norms, Mental Accounts
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Anthropologists often insist on the lack of fungibility of income when describing the ﬂow of
money within households in traditional economies, particularly in Africa. First, each household
member has speciﬁc claims on particular sources of income: He or she retains ownership or
usufructuary rights on a plot of land and thus primary claim to the income from that plot, or he
or she is entitled to the proceeds from particular crops. The obligation to share this income with
other household members is limited. While household members cooperate in some productive
activities and share their outcomes to some extent, they seem to be far from achieving perfect
risk sharing.
“Men control their own cash income, and the kinds of legitimate demands a wife can
make can be quite limited. A Yoruba wife can expect her husband to provide the
basic staples of the diet, housing, and other more irregular support depending on how
much domestic work she devotes to him (...) Beti wives remain farmers throughout
their lives. Before the recent expansion of food sales they used to depend on their
husbands for all major cash expenses, but neither in theory nor in day-to day life is
a wife’s right to her own share of her husband’s cash income guaranteed (...) Family
welfare and risk avoidance are probably improved by the family labor force having a
variety of occupations which cater to diﬀerent markets, but the need in bad times and
the opportunity in good times for a woman to earn an independent income originate
in a domestic organization with limited income sharing” (Guyer (1980), pp. 369-70)
Furthermore, the source of income may also determine its legitimate uses, and the uses
of money obtained through particular activities may be restricted. In Kenya, Shipton (1989)
describes how money obtained from the sale of land, tobacco, or gold, is “bitter” and “... must be
kept strictly apart from transactions involving permanent lineage wealth and welfare, notably
from livestock or bridewealth transactions” (p. 25-26). In Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, the Gouro, studied
by Meillassoux (1965) draw a sharp distinction between “appreciated products” (e.g., yams),
ordinary food products, products cultivated by women, and cash crops.
“Appreciated products” are always under the control of the household head for redistribution
to the entire household in the form of food. In contrast, the control of cash crops belongs to its
2producer. Cash crops and food crops, even when they are cultivated by the same individual,
and even when food crops are sold on the market, are not put to the same use:
“In the traditional community, as we have seen, most of the production comes back to
producers in the form of food. The rest is incorporated into particular goods, which
have a speciﬁc role at the time of marriage (...). These goods cannot be diverted to
personal uses. Nor are they investment goods, used for the reproduction of material
goods. Everything changes when the products of agriculture are cash crops, which
can be put to other uses (...). A greater part of this income disappears into prestige
expenditures, especially into investment into houses which are monuments to the
glory of their owners.” (Meillassoux (1965), p. 335).
These descriptions are fundamentally at odds with conventional ways in which economists
describe individual and household behavior. Standard models imply that there should be a
uniﬁed budget constraint for the entire household. If there is more than one individual, the
average share allocated to an individual’s consumption may depend on her bargaining power
(which may well be related to her average contribution to the household, and hence to her
permanent individual income), but her consumption should not ﬂuctuate on a season-to-season
basis as a function of the realization of her income. However, these descriptions suggest that
resources generated from diﬀerent activities within the household are used diﬀerently. Taken
literally, these descriptions imply that households maintain a series of discrete “accounts” into
which diﬀerent revenue ﬂows are directed, out of which diﬀerent expenditures are made, and
between which transfers are not freely made. When an account gets a windfall, expenditures out
of that “account” increase more than others.1 This has a parallel in the “mental accounting”
described in the behavioral economics literature (Thaler (1992)): Money placed by individuals
in diﬀerent “mental accounts” is not fully fungible.
This paper seeks to test the empirical relevance of these descriptions in the context of rural
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. Eﬀorts to empirically validate the mental accounts framework in behavioral
1Many descriptions imply that the separation of these “accounts” is not limited to the uses of crop proceeds,
but extend to income from non-farm enterprises and to inputs: Family or community work can be used for food
crops without compensation other than a share in the common meal, while cash wages are paid to household
workers who help with cash crops (Berger and White (1999); Ekejiuba (1995); Etienne (1980); Guyer (1984)).
3economics have mostly concentrated on comparing the propensity to consume out of income
from various types of ﬂows: The propensity to consume out of housing wealth is very low, and
the propensity to consume out of current income is very high, for example.2 In this paper, we
do not focus on the marginal propensity to consume out of diﬀerent sources of income. Instead,
we explicitly recognize that a given increase in observed current income in a given account
may be more or less permanent, depending on the type of accounts it falls in (and thus may
aﬀect consumption diﬀerently), and we test whether shocks to diﬀerent types of income aﬀect
expenditure shares over and above their eﬀects on overall expenditures.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r o c e e d so fd i ﬀerent crops are generally used to buy diﬀerent goods does
not necessarily imply that the household really maintains separate accounts. If individuals in
the household have ownership rights on speciﬁc income streams, those who earn more could have
more bargaining power: Their income will thus appear to be linked with diﬀerent purchases.
For example, using anthropological evidence from Cˆ ote d’Ivoire that attributes the proceeds
from some crops to diﬀerent genders, Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) show that income from
“male crops” tends to be put to diﬀerent uses than income from “female crops”. This is not
consistent with a unitary model of the household (where all household members have the same
utility function or a dictator makes decisions for everyone) but could be consistent with the more
general collective model (proposed notably by Chiappori, see Browning and Chiappori (1998)
for a survey), where individuals may bargain over the household allocation, but achieve Pareto
eﬃciency. Thus, one response of most economists to descriptions such as those we quoted above
would not necessarily be to deny the reality of the norms which underlie these descriptions, but to
argue that households have suﬃcient ﬂexibility on the margins to undo any binding constraints
on expenditures that would otherwise result. On average, the norms will be respected, but at
the margin money is fungible and it is possible to shift household expenditures in such a manner
that the norm does not prevent the household from achieving an eﬃcient allocation of resources.
In this paper, we present evidence that expenditure patterns in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire not only vi-
olate the restrictions implied by the collective household model, but that they do so in a way
that corresponds closely to the descriptions that can be found in the literature on the norms
2There are other examples. For example, most people who take a second mortgage on their house use the
money to ﬁnance home improvements.
4of household provisioning in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. The central observation underlying our empirical
approach is that if the household is eﬃcient, household members fully insure each other against
short term variation in individual income. Therefore, non-persistent income shocks should not
translate into diﬀerences in the allocation of resources within the household.
To identify short term income shocks, we use rainfall variation. While all household members
are subject to the same rainfall, the same pattern of precipitation has diﬀerent eﬀects on the
income produced by diﬀerent crops. In particular, a particular rainfall pattern aﬀects diﬀerently
crops that tend to be produced by women and crops that tend to be produced by men. In a
Pareto eﬃcient household, conditional on total expenditure this should not translate into any
diﬀerence in the allocation of that expenditure to diﬀerent purposes within the household. The
spirit of our test is thus to determine whether two rainfall conﬁgurations that have the same eﬀect
on total expenditure have diﬀerent eﬀects on the types of goods consumed by the household.
We examine broad expenditure aggregates and more detailed expenditures on types of food.
We reject the hypothesis of income pooling. Furthermore, the patterns of rejections we obtain
are consistent with the anthropological descriptions of income ﬂo w si nI v o i r i a nh o u s e h o l d s .I n
particular, we ﬁnd that rainfall shocks that increase the output of the “appreciated” crop, yams,
are associated with strong shifts in the composition of expenditures towards education, staples,
and overall food consumption and away from adult goods and “prestige” goods such as jewelry.
In contrast, rainfall shocks that increase the output of crops cultivated individually by either
men or women are associated with strong expenditure shifts toward adult and prestige goods.
Shocks that increase the output of crops predominantly cultivated by women shift expenditures
toward all types of food consumption (except staples), while similar shocks aﬀecting cash crops
cultivated by men have no eﬀect on the purchases of food.
Our results do not seem to be explained by obvious alternative explanations, such as mis-
speciﬁcation of the demand functions, lack of separability between labor and consumption, price
eﬀects, or lack of time separability of preferences. Moreover, because we are testing whether
the household pools observed risk, these results do not have a straightforward explanation in
the framework of simple models of imperfect information or moral hazard. They are consistent,
5however, with models of informal insurance without commitment,3 where a household member
who faces a favorable shock needs to be partially compensated in order to agree to remain part
of the insurance arrangement, and therefore where insurance can only be partial. The fact that
shocks to yam income are transmitted to expenditures on food and education, despite the fact
that yam income is formally under the control of the male household head is consistent with the
fact that there are social sanctions associated with “mis-use” of these proceeds, and therefore
there is little temptation to deviate from the pooling of yam income.
The evidence presented in this paper supports the validity and the empirical relevance of
the descriptions of separate accounts within households in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. This observation can
have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of the behavior of households, both as
consumers and as producers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we derive our empirical test.
In section 3, we discuss the data and the context of agriculture in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. In section 4,
we discuss our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Derivation of the Test
2.1 Theory
Our objective is to use rainfall as a source of exogenous variation in income from various sources
to examine a testable restriction of the collective model: The assumption that income from all
sources is pooled. To put the question more bluntly: Does rainfall variation that aﬀects farms
cultivated by a wife change the pattern of expenditure within households diﬀerently than rainfall
variation that aﬀects farms cultivated by her husband?
We illustrate our empirical strategy ﬁrst in the context of a simple one-period model of intra-
household resource allocation in a risky environment, and then move to the more general dynamic
case. It will be seen that the lessons from the one-period model generalize in a straightforward
manner.
To simplify the notation in this section, we consider the optimization problem of a household
3For an application to the household, see Coate and Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon, Thomas
and Worral (2002); and Ligon (2003).
6comprised of 2 individuals, each of whom produces only one type of crop. Of course, this
generalizes in a straightforward way to a situation where each produces diﬀerent types of crops.
Each individual cultivates a farm using labor (Li) that can be traded on a competitive market
at wage w.4 The production function on farm i is fi(Li,r), where r ≡



r1
r2


is a vector of two
measures (it will be seen that this is simple to generalize) of rainfall that aﬀect cultivation on
plot i. For example, r1 might be early season rainfall and r2 might be rainfall late in the season.
After rainfall realization r, each individual i ∈ {m,f} consumes a vector of private goods
ci. Individual i’s preferences are summarized by the expected utility function Eui(ci), where
expectations are taken over potential realizations of rainfall. The results that follow are ro-
bust to signiﬁcant generalizations of these preferences: An individual’s utility may depend on
the consumption or utility of his/her spouse. A more substantial assumption is that labor is
supplied inelastically, or that preferences over leisure are separable from preferences over other
consumption. This will be discussed below.
Any ex ante eﬃcient allocation of resources in the household can be characterized as the
solution to the program
max
ci,Li
Euf(cf)+λEum(cm)( 1 )
subject to
p · (cm + cf) ≤ ff(Lf,r)+fm(Lm,r) − w(Lf + Lm).
Note that the Pareto weight does not depend on r:I nt h ee ﬃcient allocation, risk is pooled.
We do not investigate the process through which λ is set; it may depend on many observable
or unobservable attributes of the household and its members. For example, long-run rainfall
patterns that inﬂuence proﬁtability diﬀerently on the husband’s and wife’s plots may inﬂuence
the Pareto weight. Hence, in examining the relationship between rainfall variation and the
allocation of resources within the household it is important to distinguish adequately between
the realizations of random variables (which in an eﬃcient allocation are pooled, that is to say,
they do not inﬂuence λ) and the distribution from which those realizations are drawn (which
may well be a determinant of λ).
4It is a trivial matter to extend the model to include a vector of inputs, which may be purchased, non-traded,
or traded on imperfect markets.
7This problem is separable and equivalent to
max
ci
Euf(cf)+λEum(cm)( 2 )
subject to
p · (cm + cf) ≤ π∗
f(r)+π∗
m(r)( 3 )
where π∗
i ≡ maxLi fi(r,Li) − wLi. Note that rainfall enters the eﬃcient allocation of resources
only through its eﬀect on cultivation and hence on the budget constraint, and thence on total
expenditure.
Denoting x = p · (cm + cf), we have:
ci = ci(λ,p,x)( 4 )
for i ∈ {m,f}. Conditional on expenditures, prices, and the preference and Pareto weight
parameters, consumption of any particular good is independent of the rainfall realizations r1
and r2.
Equation (4) has the implication that the eﬀect of rainfall realizations on expenditure on any
particular commodity depends only on the expenditure elasticity of demand for that commodity
and on the eﬀect of rainfall on overall expenditure.5 In other words, for any i in m, f and j in
1, 2 and any good k:
dck
i
drj
=
∂ck
i
∂x
∗
∂x
∂rj
. (5)
The collective model therefore implies the restriction that the ratio between the eﬀect of
rainfall in quarter j on consumption of good k by individual i and its eﬀect on total expenditure
should be equal across all rainfall realizations:
dck
i
dr1
∂x
∂r1
=
dck
i
dr2
∂x
∂r2
. (6)
5To reduce notational clutter, we assume for the time being that the relative prices of consumption are
not related to rainfall realizations (
∂p
∂ri = 0). This need not be the case, and it is addressed in our empirical
speciﬁcation.
8There is an analogous test for ck
m+ ck
f if only aggregate consumption of the private good is
observed.6
The essential element of the restriction (6) is the assumption that rainfall variation dri aﬀects
the collective household’s decision making only via its inﬂuence on the household’s resource con-
straint. In a more general model in which rainfall entered preferences directly, these restrictions
fail to hold. This caveat should be borne in mind when considering the results that follow.
The assumption of a perfect labor market is not essential to this analysis. Precisely the
same test emerges in a model in which there are no inter-household labor ﬂows; if supervision is
required for non-household labor; for general forms of imperfect substitutability between house-
hold and non-household labor; or if inter-household labor ﬂows through reciprocal or cooperative
arrangements. In each of these instances, it remains the case that labor decisions aﬀect con-
sumption only through their inﬂuence on the household’s resource constraint and the collective
model continues to imply (6). If labor markets are imperfect, what is essential is the assumption
that conditional on total expenditure, the consumption of leisure does not aﬀect the marginal
rates of substitution between the other components of consumption.
It is now a simple matter to generalize these observations to the more general dynamic case.
Consider a collective household with a horizon of T periods. In period t after a history of rainfall
realizations wt ≡ {r1,r 2,...,r t} individual i consumes a vector of goods ciwt. The expected utility
of individual i is E
P
t βt
iUi(ciwt). The budget constraint facing the household in period t after
history of rainfall realizations wt (note that wt includes the rainfall realization in the current
period) is
p · (cfwt + cmwt)+Awt ≤ RAwt−1 + π∗
mwt + π∗
fwt, (7)
where Awt i st h ea m o u n ti n v e s t e da f t e rh i s t o r ywt by the household in a safe asset that earns a
return R.7
6Data on rainfall and expenditures are required to estimate (4) or (6). We do not observe πi,n o ri ss u c hd a t a
required for the test. Hence, we avoid the issues raised by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), which provides a very
useful discussion of the potential consequences of treating estimates of the relationship between rainfall variation
and output variation as if it were the relationship between rainfall and proﬁts.
7It is trivial to generalize the investment process to make it so that people are investing (perhaps in their
farms), that this return depends on rainfall, that it is uncertain, or that they allocate these savings across a
portfolio of assets. The only change to the model will be the additional notation, because it will all aﬀect the
9There is a budget constraint for each history of rainfall realization, so for example the
budget constraint in period t following rainfall history ˆ wt ≡ {ˆ wt−1,r t} is not the same as that
after history ˜ wt ≡ {˜ wt−1,r t} if ˜ wt−1 6=ˆ wt−1. For notational simplicity, we have not permitted
any inter-household insurance, though this would leave the problem essentially unchanged.
Any eﬃcient allocation of household resources can be characterized as the solution to:
max
{ciwt}
E
X
t
βt
fUf(cfwt)+λE
X
t
βt
mUm(cmwt)( 8 )
for some value of λ, subject to (7) and a period T constraint on AwT.A ne ﬃcient allocation must
have eﬃcient continuations after any history of rainfall wt, so in period t an eﬃcient allocation
must be the solution of
max
ciwt,Awt
EUf(cfwt)+λEUm(cmwt)+Vwt(Awt;λ)( 9 )
subject to
p · (cfwt + cmwt)+Awt ≤ RAwt−1 + π∗
mwt + π∗
fwt. (10)
The function Vwt(.) is complex: It depends on the preference parameters (including λ)a n do n
the information about the distribution of future proﬁts that is incorporated in the history of
rainfall through the current period. However, the maximand is separable between {ciwt} and
Awt.L e tA∗
wt be the eﬃcient level of assets held after wt.T h e ne ﬃcient consumption is
{c∗
iwt} =a r gm a x
ciwt
EUf(cfwt)+λEUm(cmwt)
subject to
p · (cfwt + cmwt) ≤ RAwt−1 + π∗
mwt + π∗
fwt − A∗
wt.
Since xwt ≡ RAwt−1 + π∗
mwt + π∗
fwt − A∗
wt, we have once again
ciwt = ci(λ,p,x wt)( 1 1 )
for i ∈ {f,m}. Conditional on expenditure, prices, and preference and Pareto weight param-
eters, consumption of particular goods is independent of rainfall realizations r1,r 2.T h u s a n
analogous form of the exclusion restriction (4) holds in the dynamic setting. It can now be
allocation of current consumption only through the function Vwt(Awt) in equation (9).
10seen that the general dynamic problem is akin to the static model discussed above. Again, the
crucial restriction of the collective model is income pooling: Realizations of rainfall inﬂuence the
allocation of current consumption only through their aﬀect on current expenditure. We have
the testable restriction that
∂ck
iwt
∂r1
∂xwt
∂r1
=
∂ck
iwt
∂r2
∂xwt
∂r2
(12)
must hold for any consumption good k.
Equation (12) is an overidentifying restriction. It says that a particular rainfall realization
must inﬂuence the demand of a particular good only to the extent it inﬂuences expenditure. In
the empirical work below, we present both this test and a particular linear combination of these
restrictions that is more straightforward to interpret.
2.2 Empirical Implementation
In order to implement tests based on (12) it is necessary to make some assumptions regarding
the form of the commodity demand function (11). In particular, we assume that the demand
for a particular commodity c by household i in period t are of the form
log(cit)=αlog(xit)+f(λi)+Xitδ + υi + νit, (13)
where Xit are year and region interactions (for the four agro-climatic zones in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire), υi
is a household ﬁxed eﬀect, and νit is an error term that potentially reﬂects the eﬀect of changes in
relative prices on demand as well as other shocks to the preferences of households. If we assume
that markets are regionally integrated, so that at a given point in time relative prices are the
same across a particular agro-climatic zone, the eﬀect of rainfall on relative prices and hence
patterns of demand is contained within the ﬁxed region-year eﬀect (Xit). The most controversial
element of this assumption is that it does not permit the price faced by a household to diﬀer
from that prevailing in the region. If local markets are not well integrated into a regional system,
then this assumption is violated. We discuss this possibility when we comment on our empirical
results.
Two important functional form assumptions are embedded in (13). First, we are assum-
ing that commodity demands are multiplicatively separable between the Pareto weight λ and
11household expenditure x. Second, we are assuming that commodity demands are log-linear in
expenditure.
There are preferences that yield commodity demand functions of this form. For example,
we obtain (13) if m and f have non-identical homothetic preferences.8 More important, it is
possible to test these assumptions and we do so in section 4.4.1.
It is possible, in principle, to test the eﬃcient households hypothesis by examining the
exclusion restriction implied by (11): Conditional on total expenditure and a household ﬁxed
eﬀect, demand for any particular good does not depend on the rainfall realization. Such tests,
however, present some potentially serious problems: In the presence of measurement errors in
expenditure, the relationship between total expenditure and the expenditure in a particular
good may be over or understated.9 Moreover, shocks to total expenditure could be caused by
events that also aﬀect preferences (for example, a drop in expenditure could be due to sickness,
and this could also lead to an increase in medical expenditure). If the model is mis-speciﬁed,
the coeﬃcients of the rainfall variables will be inconsistently estimated as well, and misleading
conclusions could be drawn.
These problems do not aﬀect tests based on overidentifying restrictions suggested by equa-
tion (12). To implement these tests, in addition to the functional form of equation (13), we
assume that rainfall in millimeters (disaggregated by season, and including indicator variables
for extreme rainfall events) aﬀects the logarithm of proﬁts. In turn, assuming that the relation-
ship between total expenditure and total proﬁt is linear in logarithms, for a vector of rainfall R,
we have the following relationship between rainfall and total outlay:
log(xt)=Ritα + Xitδx + ²it. (14)
Combining equations (13) and (14), we obtain the following reduced form relationship be-
8For example, suppose ci = {ci1,c i2}
0, and that preferences for i are Eui(ci)=Ec
αi
i1 c
γ−αi
i2 .T h e n i t c a n b e
shown that the Pareto eﬃcient allocation described in (1) yields a demand for, say, commodity 1 (c1 = cf1 +cm1)
which is ln(c1)=l n ( αfg(λ)+αm(1 − g(λ)) + lnx − lnp1.
9Imagine that food expenditure is measured with error: Since it is an important part of total expenditure,
the measurement error appears both on the left and on the right of the equation, leading us to overestimate the
relationship between total expenditure and food expenditure. See Deaton (1997) and Bouis and Haddad (1992)
for discussion.
12tween the demand for good i and rainfall precipitation:
log(cit)=Ritπ + f(λi)+Xitδ + υi + νit. (15)
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation (14) and (15), we obtain the reduced form system:
log(xi2) − log(xi1)=( Ri2 − Ri1)α +( Xi2 − Xi1)δx +( ²i2 − ²i1), (16)
log(ci2) − log(ci1)=( Ri2 − Ri1)π +( Xi2 − Xi1)δ +( νi2 − νi1), (17)
The test suggested in equation (12) is a simple overidentiﬁcation test: We want to test the
hypothesis that
π = κα (18)
for some scalar κ. In the empirical work below, we use a non-linear Wald test to test this
hypothesis.
One drawback of the test based on (18) is that it is not explicitly linked with variation in
income from various origins, and thus cannot be directly linked to the anthropological evidence.
To make this link explicit and increase power by testing a speciﬁc hypothesis, we form linear
combinations of the elements of (R2 − R1)t h a tr e ﬂect the variations in income from various
sources. This is implemented by estimating separately for each group of crops (male crops,
female crops, and yams) a linear regression of the diﬀerence over years of the logarithm of
income from each crop in the group (output valued at market price minus inputs valued at
market price) on the diﬀerence over the two years in rainfall realizations, and calculating the
predicted values from these regressions.
Hence, with s ∈ {m,f,y} deﬁning a speciﬁc group of crops, we estimate:
log(yis2) − log(yis1)=( Ri2 − Ri1)γys +( Xi2 − Xi1)δys +( ξsw2 − ξsw1). (19)
We then form: DRis =( Ri2 − Ri1)ˆ γys. Note that equations (16) to (18) imply that if we
consider any linear combination of the elements of (Ri2 −Ri1)( s a yDRis), we can construct an
analogous test. We estimate:
13log(xi2) − log(xi1)=
S X
s=1
DRisαs +( Xi2 − Xi1)δx +( ²i2 − ²i1)( 2 0 )
and
log(ci2) − log(ci1)=
S X
s=1
DRisπs +( Xi2 − Xi1)δ +( νwi2 − νwi1), (21)
and we test whether πs
αs =
πs0
αs0 for any s,s0 ∈ {f,m,y}. Therefore, instead of looking generally at
rainfall realizations we focus on three particular dimensions of rainfall variation that are related
to diﬀerent sources of income for the household and that therefore correspond to diﬀerent aspects
of ‘provisioning’ that are prominent in qualitative discussions of household economics in West
Africa.10
3D a t a a n d C o n t e x t
3.1 Data
The data for this paper comes from the Cˆ ote d’Ivoire Living Standards Measurement Sur-
vey (CILSS). The survey started in 1985, with 1,500 households. In 1986, half of these were
re-surveyed, and 750 households were added to the survey. In 1987, the households newly intro-
duced in 1986 were surveyed again and 750 new households were added. In 1988, a ﬁnal wave
of the survey was collected in the same fashion. For this study, we stack the 3 waves of the
panel (1985/86, 1986/87 and 1987/88). The data set includes a wealth of information on the
households, including information on their income from agriculture and other sources, health
and education variables, ethnic aﬃliation, and a detailed expenditure survey.11
The data indicates separately the output of each crop cultivated by the household and the
inputs spent on its cultivation. However, it does not record labor supply separately for each
crop. It can also be merged with data from rainfall stations near the communities where the
household is interviewed. Rainfall is recorded monthly for the past 14 years for most rainfall
stations. We construct for each household aggregate rain recorded at the nearest rainfall station
10DRis, therefore, is the predicted relationship between rainfall realizations and the change in net output of
crop group s for household i, where output is net of purchased inputs but not family labor.
11It is publicly available on the World Bank LSMS web site.
14for each calendar quarter for the year that immediately preceded the most recent harvest (we
label this as “current year”) and for each quarter of the previous year.
We drop households that reside in Abidjan. We keep only households engaged in agriculture,
where there is at least one man and one woman, and where households produce at least one crop
deﬁned as “male only” and one crop deﬁned as “female only”. In addition, some observations
are dropped because of a lack of information on rainfall. Our ﬁnal sample has a little over 800
households (each observed twice).
3.2 Gender, Ethnicity, and Agriculture in Cˆ ote D’Ivoire
Farmers in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire work in a variety of agro-climatic conditions, from the rather dry
s a v a n n a hi nt h en o r t ht ow e tf o r e s ti nt h es o u t h .I nn or e g i o ni si r r i g a t i o nc o m m o n p l a c e ;a l m o s t
all cultivation is rain fed. Rural households are heavily dependent upon crop income for their
livelihoods: In rural areas of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, farm income makes up 75% of total household income
(Kozel (1990); Vijverberg (1988)).
An important characteristic of the organization of agriculture in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, as in other
West African contexts, is that much production takes place on plots that are managed by par-
ticular individuals within the household. Decision-making authority with respect to cultivation
on these plots rests with that individual, cultivation expenses are paid by that individual and
income from the plot is attributed to that individual. Household members commonly provide
labor on each others’ plots, at least partly as a consequence of a gender division of labor by
task that cuts across the gender division of crops. Therefore, individuals in households rarely
have absolute autonomy with respect to decision-making on their individual plots. However, a
voluminous literature makes it clear that individuals have substantive control over decisions on
their plots, and that nominal control over the output from a plot belongs to the cultivator.12
One goal of this paper is an examination of the hypothesis that this nominal control over output
from a plot inﬂuences the allocation of consumption within the household.
12Doss (1998), Doss (2001), Bassett (1985), Bassett (1988), Bigot (1979), Davison (1988), Dey (1993), Saito,
Mekonnen and Spurling (n.d.), Gastellu (1987), Guyer (1980), Guyer and Peters (1987), Jones (1986), Meillassoux
(1975), Berry (1993), von Braun and Webb (1989), Carney and Watts (1991), Goldstein (2000), Weekes-Vagliani
(1985), Weekes-Vagliani (1990).
15Our basic test of the eﬃciency of the pooling of income and risk within households in Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire does not rely on any particular mapping between the gender of the cultivator and the
crops he or she cultivates. However, directed by the descriptive literature, we reﬁne the test by
constructing three linear combinations of rainfall realizations, one for the cash crops cultivated
by men, one for yams (which are cultivated by men), and the other for crops cultivated by
women. We follow the method of Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) by drawing on the ethnographic
literature to carry out the assignment.
We treat separately yams, the main “appreciated product”, and the only major food crop
controlled by men throughout the country.13 The other crops assigned to men are cocoa, coﬀee,
wood, pineapple and kola nuts. Coconut, plantain, oil palm, taro, sweet potato, vegetables,
banana, fruit trees and some minor crops are assigned to women.14 For cassava, maize, tobacco,
and sugar cane the evidence is not suﬃciently strong that the crops are substantially more likely
to be grown on the plots of one gender or the other, so they are not assigned. In addition,
there is some ethnographic evidence that cotton, rice, millet, sorghum and fonio can be assigned
to particular genders in some ethnic groups, but we do not consider them. Approximately 80
percent of the value of agricultural output can be attributed in this manner.
It is important to note that no crop is exclusively cultivated by farmers of only one gender.
Reporting from neighboring Ghana, Doss (2001) relates, “...I spoke with a woman who emphat-
ically explained that yams were a man’s crop and then invited me to see her yam farm.” The
1991-92 round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) provides information on the crops
cultivated on particular plots and responses to the question “Who keeps the revenue from the
sale of the produce?” Unfortunately, data on plot-speciﬁc crop production is not collected, but
it is possible to examine the frequency with which farmers of diﬀerent genders engage in the
cultivation of particular crops. Doss (2001) carries out this exercise and shows that substantial
numbers of both male and females are engaged in the cultivation of each of the 31 crops speciﬁed
13Rice is a male crop in some groups, a female crop in others, and in others the gender pattern of rice cultivation
is very complex.
14Meillassoux (1965), Weekes-Vagliani (1985), Weekes-Vagliani (1990), Bassett (1988), and Gastellu (1987) are
the primary sources for the assignment. The sources used by Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) are a subset of this
group. Our assignments diﬀer from theirs only in that ours are somewhat more conservative; some crops that
they assign to a gender we leave unassigned.
16in the GLSS data. For no crop are women a majority of the cultivators. However, it is the case
that there are systematic diﬀerences across crops in the likelihood that they are cultivated by
women relative to men. For example, plantain farmers are approximately 50 percent more likely
to be female than are cocoa farmers.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Eﬀects of Rainfall on Income from Crops
Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2 present F statistics obtained after the estimation of equation (19)
for male non-yam cash crops, yams, and female crops. The estimated equations are presented
in Table A1. We include as male (or female) crops only those crops that are cultivated by
males (or females) in all ethnic groups. In all equations, we include year and region eﬀects
(for the four agro-climatic regions in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire) and their interactions. The normal pattern
of rainfall in these seasons is very diﬀerent in forest areas and in the savannah: In the forest,
there are two rainy seasons (March to June and September to November) and two dry seasons,
while there is only one rainy reason in the savannah. We partition the year into four seasons
(December to February, March to June, July and August, and September to November), and
we allow for diﬀerent coeﬃcients in the savannah and in the forest. We include rainfall for the
eight seasons prior to the most recent harvest. We use two types of rainfall variables: Rainfall
precipitation in millimeters, and a variable that indicates a particularly severe ‘shock’ when the
rainfall precipitation was more than one standard deviation above or below its 14-year mean in
this station. Therefore, we estimate 32 coeﬃcients for each equation (except for the male cash
crops, which are cultivated only in the forest).15
As the F tests in Table 2 indicate, rainfall variables are jointly signiﬁcant in all regressions,
and the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in each of them. Speciﬁcally, past year rainfall
15Our choice of a speciﬁcation was driven by the agro-climate of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, because there is clear evidence
that: (1) both current and lagged rainfall inﬂuence yields; (2) the eﬀect of rainfall on yields is often nonlinear, with
exceptional events having a role; and (3) rainfall patterns and their eﬀects on yield are very diﬀerent in forest and
savannah regions (see Amanor (1994), Hopkins (1973), Nicholson (1980), and Sanders, Shapiro and Ramaswamy
(1996)). A more parsimonious speciﬁcation that includes no interactions between the rainfall variables and the
savannah indicator produces results similar to those reported in Tables 4 to 7.
17matters more than this year rainfall for the male cash crops (mostly tree crops), while both past
and current year rainfall realizations matter for female crops and yams. The coeﬃcients in the
appendix reveal that in the savannah, rainfall shocks inﬂuence yam income more strongly than
they do income from women’s crops. In the forest, shocks in the most recent long dry and long
rainy season negatively aﬀect both yam and female crops.
Thus, there are strong diﬀerences across crop groups in the relationship of rainfall realizations
to net income. This suggests that a test of income pooling based on evaluating whether rainfall
patterns that aﬀect diﬀerent crop groups inﬂuence expenditure shares of diﬀerent goods over
and above their eﬀects on total expenditures could have some power.
4.2 Unconstrained Tests: Rainfall and Demand
Table 3 presents the overidentiﬁcation tests of Pareto eﬃciency, based on estimating equation
(16) (with the 32 rainfall variables) and then testing jointly the hypothesis that all the ratios
between the corresponding coeﬃcients in the two reduced-form equations are equal. We use as
dependent variables expenditures grouped in broad categories (columns (1) to (5)), and more
detailed expenditures on particular goods (columns (6) to (11)). We present in the ﬁrst row a test
that the rainfall coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant. The rainfall variables are jointly signiﬁcant
in all regressions.
The second row presents the overidentiﬁcation tests of Pareto eﬃciency based on equation
(18). The overidentiﬁcation test never rejects equality. However, this test is likely to have very
low power, and we turn to testing a more speciﬁc hypothesis in Table 4.
4.3 Constrained Tests: Predicted Crop Income and Demand
In order to explicitly link our speciﬁcation to the anthropological literature we discussed above,
we estimate equations (20) and (21). The results are presented in panel A of Table 4. In
column 1, we present results from regressing diﬀerences in the logarithm of total expenditures
on predicted changes in the logarithm of income from yams, male cash crops, and female crops.
The coeﬃcients are all signiﬁcant at the one percent level and they are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other. The elasticity of total expenditure with respect to predicted income from the
three sources varies from 0.1 (for male non-yam income) to 0.3 (for female crop income).
18In the following columns, we present the coeﬃcients of estimating equation (21). The ﬁnal
row presents the tests of the overidentiﬁcation restrictions. The overidentiﬁcation restrictions are
rejected at the ﬁve percent level for prestige goods, adult goods, staples, and vegetables and at
approximately the eleven percent level for education expenditures. It is also useful to note from
the ﬁnal two columns that the source of food consumed in the household is sensitive to income
ﬂows: The overidentiﬁcation restrictions are rejected at the one percent level for purchases of
food, and at the ﬁfteen percent level for food consumed from family farms.
Moreover, not only do the eﬀects of predicted male and female income diﬀer, but although
men typically farm yams, the eﬀect of predicted yam income often diﬀers radically from that
of income from the other male crops. In addition, an examination of the coeﬃcient estimates
reveals that the deviations from eﬃciency correspond closely with the anthropological accounts
discussed above.
Variations in income from male non-yam crops and from female-controlled crops are much
more strongly associated with the consumption of adult goods (tobacco and alcohol) than are
variations in yam income (for this comparison, as for all those that follow, it is understood that
these statements are relative to the eﬀects of these income ﬂows on total expenditure). Precisely
the same pattern is observed, just as strongly, for prestige goods (jewelry and adult clothing
items such as “pagnes”). Income from yams, it seems, is associated with household public goods
and basic necessities while income from the individually-controlled female and male cash crops
is associated with expenditures on alcohol, tobacco, and prestige goods.
Expenditures on education are positively related to yam income, but inversely related to
income from male non-yam crops and from female-controlled crops. In contrast, predicted
increases in income from male non-yam income are associated with decreases in expenditure on
purchased food, while increases in yam income are associated with decreases in expenditure on
adult and prestige goods.
Not surprisingly, consumption of staples is much more strongly related to variations in yam
income than to variations in male non-yam crop income or to female crop income. Consumption
of vegetables is much more strongly related to female crop income than to either yam or non-yam
male crop income. These results could be a consequence of local relative price movements where
markets are not well-integrated, or to marketing costs of crops, which will lead households
19in corner solutions to increase home consumption of home-produced commodities when they
increase the production of this commodity. However, the results on other food items are not
easily explained by this relative price eﬀect: If all that was going on was that households
substituted towards the goods that they produce in years when it is more abundant, one should
see that both yam income and female income are less strongly associated with the consumption of
other food items (in particular, food purchases) than male cash income. In practice, increased
yam production is directly associated with increases in household consumption of all other
foodstuﬀs, and not only staples. Moreover, variations in female crop income are much more
strongly associated with purchases of staples than variations in yam or male non-yam income.16
More interestingly, it is also the case that both overall consumption and purchases of vegetables
are much more strongly related to income from female non-vegetable income than to yam or
male non-yam income. Overall food purchases (and consumption of processed foods, albeit at a
low level of statistical signiﬁcance) are much more strongly associated with variations in income
from female-controlled crops than income from yam or male non-yam crops.
All of these results regarding the relationship between yam income and expenditures on
particular goods are consistent with the idea that income from yams is associated with household
public goods and basic necessities. This corresponds to Meillassoux’ description of yams as an
“appreciated good” under the control of the household head for redistribution in the household.
Moreover, these eﬀects are large. A 10% increase in income from yams is associated with a 3%
decline in expenditures on prestige goods, whileas i m i l a ri n c r e a s ei nf e m a l e( m a l en o n - y a m )
income is associated with an 10% (7%) increase in expenditures on prestige goods. A 10%
increase in yam income is associated with a 5% decline in expenditures on adult goods, while
a similar increase in female (male non-yam) income is associated with a 15% (9%) increase in
expenditure on adult goods. A 10% increase in yam income corresponds to a 3% increase in
education expenditure, while a similar increase in female (male non-yam) income corresponds
to a 1% (1%) decline in educational expenditure. Shifts in income from yam to either female-
controlled or male non-yam crops are associated with strong declines in expenditure on education
and staple food consumption, and strong increases in the consumption of adult and prestige
goods.
16These results and those regarding vegetable purchases below are not shown, but are available from the authors.
20There are also some strong diﬀerences in expenditure patterns from transitory ﬂuctuations
in female and male non-yam income. A 10% increase in income from female-controlled crops
is associated with a 4% increase in expenditure on purchased foods and a 5% increase in meat
purchases, while a similar increase in income from male non-yam crops is associated with a .3%
decline in purchases of food and no rise in meat consumption.
This pattern corresponds with discussions of the role of ‘chop money’ in the descriptive
accounts of household resource allocation in West Africa. In much of West Africa, the male
head of household is responsible for a “statutory contribution” to his wife to prepare meals, but
after that generally ﬁxed obligation is met, he “acts on his own account .... He contributes to, but
is never solely responsible for, the total expenditure of the component hearth-hold(s)”(Ekejiuba
(1995), pp. 52-53).17 In neighboring Ghana, the ‘chop money’ provided by a husband to a
wife for the preparation of meals is a regular, ﬁxed amount that can be changed only after
negotiations that often involve extended family members; when a husband does not meet this
obligation it can be an important source of friction within the household and between the
extended families (Goldstein (2000)). Women have access to this base contribution from their
husbands to provide meals for the household, but “it is ultimately the woman’s responsibility
to feed everyone, whatever the amount she receives from her husband”.18 When their own
disposable incomes increase, some of this increase is used for purchased foods; the rest on goods
that women privately consume.
We raised the possibility that changes in local relative prices might bias these estimates.
We control for region and time interactions to deal with price eﬀects if markets are regionally
integrated. To conﬁrm that markets seem to be regionally integrated, we use the information
available on prices for a wide range of goods at the CILSS cluster level for 3 of the 4 years of
17Ekejiuba uses the term ‘hearth-hold’ to mean a mother and her children.
18This is a quote from Etienne (1980), describing the relationship between husband and wives in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire.
Etienne (1980) describes how among Baule households in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, “in the case of some essential subsistence
products, production was entirely the responsibility of one or the other sex and the producer was the ‘owner’ of
the product or, in other words, controlled its distribution. In the case of other products, both sexes contributed to
production, each being in charge of speciﬁc tasks or phases of the production process; the sex that was considered
to have initiated the process and taken responsibility for it ‘owned’ the product or controlled its distribution” (p.
219-220). In addition, see Guyer (1995) who describes how Senufo women in Cˆ o t ed ’ I v o i r ea r er e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h e
production of certain crops, and that they have control over the incomes from those crops.
21the survey. We ﬁnd in Table 5 almost no commodity for which there is a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between rainfall and price, conditional on the region × year eﬀects. Only for palm
oil and for plastic sandals are the predicted income variables jointly signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
fact that the overidentiﬁcation tests are not rejected for total food consumption, but are for
the consumption of other goods (adult goods, education, and prestige goods) whose prices are
not likely to substantially vary with rainfall pattern suggests that this result is not entirely due
to relative price eﬀects. As we discussed above, some results may be explained by marketing
costs for households whose marginal consumption of a good is not transacted on the market (the
increase in the consumption of yams when the household produces more yams). However, most
of these results are not consistent with such price eﬀe c t s ,s i n c ep o s i t i v es h o c k si nm a l ec a s hc r o p
income are not associated with food purchases (which they would be, under this hypothesis),
while shocks to yam and female income are both associated with increases in the consumption
of other types of food. We conclude that there is no evidence that rainfall-induced variations in
local prices can account for the association we observe between changes in consumption patterns
and shocks in the ﬂows of diﬀerent categories of net crop income.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we examine several possible threats to our interpretation of the results:
The assumptions of linearity and separability in commodity demand, which are central to the
derivation of the overidentiﬁcation test, the assumptions of time separability, and the assumption
of separability between consumption and labor supply.
4.4.1 Testing for Separability and Linearity in Commodity Demand
Our test depends on the linearity and separability of the demand function. If the demand
functions are not linear, then one expects diﬀerent reactions of consumption to the same income
shock, depending on the overall wealth of the household, which could spuriously translate into
patterns similar to those present in the data. Moreover, if they are not linear, then in general the
unobserved Pareto weight and overall expenditures will not enter additively in the log demand
functions, which would preclude a simple strategy of ﬂexibly controlling for total expenditure
and checking for the exclusion of the rainfall variables in this equation.
22Fortunately, under the null hypothesis that the household is Pareto eﬃcient, it is possible
to test our assumptions that commodity demand functions are separable and linear. Consider
a more general form for the commodity demand function (13):
log(cit)=Φ(log(xit),λi)+Xitδ + υi + νit. (22)
We will consider a group of households that share a particular characteristic (perhaps, ethnicity).
For this group G,d e ﬁne
ΦG(log(x)) ≡ E(Φ(log(xit),λi)|xit = x,i ∈ G).
The basis of testing our assumptions regarding separability and linearity is that ΦG(log(x))
and ΦH(log(x)) are identical (up to a constant) for all arbitrary groups G and H only if
Φ(log(x),λ)=φ(log(x)) + f(λ).
To see the idea of the test, consider an extreme example in which λi does not vary across
households within groups, but does vary across groups. If Φ(log(x),λ) is not separable — say,
Φ(log(x),λ)=λlog(x), then ΦG(log(x)) has a diﬀerent slope than ΦH(log(x)).
So for households in G, we consider estimating ΦG(x)i n
log(cit)=ΦG(log(xit)) + Xitδ + υi + νit + ηit (23)
where ηit = Φ(log(xit),λi)−ΦG(xit). With data from two periods (t =1 ,2) on each household,
we can take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (23) to obtain:
log(ci2) − log(ci1)=ΦG(log(xi2)) − ΦG(log(xi1)) + (Xi2 − Xi1)δ + νi2 − νi1 + ηi2 − ηi1, (24)
which we re-write as
log(ci2) − log(ci1)=g(log(xi2),log(xi1)) + (Xi2 − Xi1)δ + νi2 − νi1 + ηi2 − ηi1. (25)
We then follow Robinson (1988) and Hausman and Newey (1995) to estimate δ. To simplify
notation, let y be the vector log(c2)−log(c1), z1 be the vector log(x1), z2 be the vector log(x2),
m be the matrix [(Xi2 − Xi1)]. The estimator of δ conditional on membership in group G is:
ˆ δG =
" N X
i=1
(mi − ˆ E[m|z1i,z 2i,G])(mi − ˆ E[m|z1i,z 2i,G])0
#−1 " N X
i=1
(mi − ˆ E[m|z1i,z 2i,G])(yi − ˆ E[y|z1i,z 2i,G])0
#
23In other words, ˆ δG is obtained by estimating (separately) the nonparametric relationships
between y and (z1,z 2)a n dm and (z1,z 2), forming the residuals, and regressing the residuals
of y on the residuals of m. The non-parametric estimator we use to estimate the conditional
expectations is the Fan (1992) locally weighted regression, with a quartic kernel.
To calculate ˆ ΦG(x), we ﬁrst obtain the estimate of g(z1,z 2) by partialling out the coeﬃcient
of m (see Robinson (1988) and Hausman and Newey (1995)):
ˆ gG(z1,z 2)= ˆ E[y|z1,z 2,G] − E[m|z1,z 2,G]ˆ δG.
We then apply the partial means method suggested by Porter (1996) to recover the shape of
ΦG(.) (up to an unidentiﬁed constant term) in equation (23):
ˆ ΦG(z)=0 .5 ∗

 1
N
N X
j=1
ˆ E[y|(z,z2j,G)]

 − 0.5 ∗

 1
N
N X
j=1
ˆ E[y|(z1j,z,G)]

.
Pointwise conﬁdence intervals for ˆ ΦG(z) are constructed based on 50 bootstrap replications.
We estimate ˆ ΦG(x)a n dˆ ΦH(x) for groups deﬁned by observables that are a priori likely to
be associated with diﬀerent λ.W ed e ﬁne a ﬁrst pair of groups by ethnicity, and a second pair
by estimates of the relative variance of the incomes of husbands and wives.
Figures 1a—k present estimates of ΦAkan and ΦNon−Akan, where group “Akan” households are
members of matrilineal Akan ethnic groups, and “Non-Akan” households are members of other
ethnic groups. Inheritance systems diﬀer in important ways across these groups, and this could
translate into systematic diﬀerences in λi across these groups. However, for all but vegetable
(and perhaps meat) consumption, the estimated ˆ ΦAkan(x)a n dˆ ΦNon−Akan(x)a r ed i ﬃcult to
distinguish across these broad ethnic classes. Moreover, in almost all cases the estimated demand
function is very close to linear.
Figures 2a—k present similar estimates for a pair of groups deﬁned by the relative variance
of incomes of husbands and wives. The estimate of female (male) income variance is simply
the squared change in income attributable to crops controlled by the female (male) across the
two years the household is observed. Households are assigned to the “High Female Variance”
(“High Male Variance”) group if the estimate of the variance of female (male) income is higher
than that of male (female) income. If λi is related to the riskiness of the productive activities of
the individuals in household i, then it may diﬀer systematically across these groups. However,
24we again see that for almost all goods, the demand functions are very similar across these
groups (here, the exceptions are education expenditures and vegetable consumption). Again,
the estimated demand functions are very close to linear.
Therefore, we see no evidence of important non-separabilities between the Pareto weight
λi and total expenditure in commodity demands. In addition, log demand is estimated to be
approximately linear in log expenditure.
4.4.2 Labor Supply and Commodity Demand
Another important assumption we made in the derivation of the overidentiﬁcation test is the
separability between labor supply and the consumption choices. If labor markets are well func-
tioning, this assumption will be satisﬁed. In practice, however, it may not be satisﬁed in several
cases. If labor demand moves with rain and labor markets are imperfect, and leisure is not sepa-
rable from other consumption, then in an eﬃcient allocation rainfall could inﬂuence commodity
demand even conditional on total expenditure. For example, if there is an important nutrition-
productivity eﬀect, then the demand for (say) calories might vary with rainfall. If diﬀerent crops
have diﬀerent eﬀort requirements, or if the labor market works better for some crops than others
(which, according to Meillassoux (1965), is true — there is a spot labor market for cash crops,
but not for yams), then the demand for calories will vary with rainfall even conditional on total
expenditure. Another possibility is that some of the laborers are paid in food, rather than in
cash (again, a possibility raised by Meillassoux (1965)), which may again show up in diﬀerential
consumption.
We examine this possibility in Table 6, where we show: First, that agricultural labor demand
is not strongly associated with rainfall realizations (neither household labor nor amount of money
spent in paid labor strongly changes with income increases predicted by rainfall). Second, that to
the extent labor demand moves with rainfall realizations, it does so in a way that is not consistent
with a nutrition-productivity explanation of our results. In particular, we see that rainfall that
is associated with higher output of female crops and male cash crops is associated with a higher
demand for labor. If nutrition productivity links were the cause of the rejection of Pareto
eﬃciency, these rainfall realizations would be associated with higher demand for calories, not
higher demand for adult or prestige goods. Finally, the last line of Table 6 show overidentiﬁcation
25tests similar to those performed for consumption expenditures. With this test, we are testing
whether each type of labor is more strongly associated with rainfall favorable to one crop than
with rainfall favorable to another crop, over and above their eﬀect on total expenditure. If this
were the case, and these diﬀerent types of labor were also associated with diﬀerent consumption
choices, then our assumption would not be satisﬁed. In fact, none of the overidentiﬁcation tests
are signiﬁcant. This provides some conﬁdence in our interpretation that the expenditure results
are not the consequence of diﬀerential increases in the demand for labor that then translate into
diﬀerent consumption requirements.
So far, we have treated the household as a well-deﬁned entity, without taking into account the
fact that household composition may be endogenous to rainfall realization. A possible reason for
some of the eﬀects we found in section 4.3 is that household composition is actually responding
to rainfall: For example, the household could take on more prime age adults when the yam crop
is going to be plentiful, both for providing extra labor supply, and as a way to provide insurance
to other villagers or relatives. For the same reason, the household could also take on more
children. If this phenomenon were driven by total expenditure only, this would not translate
into diﬀerential consumption of particular goods conditional on total expenditure. However, the
increase in the production of some crops may lead to larger changes in household composition.
It can, for example, happen that nephews move in with their aunt when she is in good ﬁnancial
standing (Akresh (2003)).
To the extent that taking on relatives is, to some extent, private consumption, the ﬁnding
that this is actually happening would not necessarily invalidate our results, but rather provide
an interpretation for them. In practice, however, as we show in Table 7, household size and
composition do not seem to respond diﬀerentially to diﬀerent types of rainfall. Household com-
position is indeed sensitive to increases in predicted income due to rainfall: Family size increases
with predicted income, and this seems mostly driven by 5 to 14 year-old children (presumably
due to fostering) and to some extent prime age adults (both males and female). However,
these increases are proportional to the eﬀect of the predicted income on total expenditure, and
none of the overidentiﬁcation tests are signiﬁcant: While there is evidence that household size
and composition is sensitive to household income, there seems to be no evidence that it reacts
diﬀerentially to increases in diﬀerent types of predicted income.
264.4.3 Time Separability of Preferences
If, contrary to the model in section 2.1, the marginal utility of the consumption of {ciwt} is
aﬀected by consumption in period t−1, then the recursivity that produces equation (9) fails, as
do the testable restrictions. It is important to note that this is not a matter of imperfect ﬁnancial
markets: equation (9) remains valid with imperfect or absent credit markets. Instead, it arises
when consumption is spread out over multiple years, as in a model with habit formation or with
durable consumption when rental markets or markets for used products are absent. However,
in panel B of Table 4 we examine this possibility and ﬁnd no evidence of non-separabilities over
time in demand.
The speciﬁcation in panel B is identical to that of panel A, with the exception that rainfall
realizations are lagged 8 seasons (2 years) relative to those in panel A.19 “Predicted lagged
male non-yam income”, for example, is deﬁned as 2-year lagged rainfall changes times the
coeﬃcients estimated in columns (5)-(6) of Table A1. As anticipated in (9), column (1) provides
evidence that lagged changes in income inﬂuence current expenditure. There are indeed non-
trivial dynamics in the expenditure process: A particular rainfall realization has implications for
the distribution of future proﬁts over multiple years, and therefore for saving and expenditure
choices over time. Also as one would expect, these eﬀects are strongest for rainfall realizations
that inﬂuence male non-yam income, which is largely generated from cocoa and other tree crops.
As a consequence, we see eﬀects of lagged changes in predicted income on the demands
for particular consumption goods in columns (2)-(11). However, all of these eﬀects are closely
proportional to those on overall consumption: In no instance is the overidentiﬁcation test even
close to rejected. Therefore, we ﬁnd no evidence that lagged income realizations are associated
with changes in the composition of current demand, and thus no evidence of non-separabilities
over time in consumption.
19We construct DRit =( Ri,t−2−Ri,t−3)ˆ γys for s ∈ {m,y,f} where time periods are years, and ˆ γys is estimated
in (19).
274.5 Interpretation: Can the Results Be Explained by Information Asymme-
tries?
The full information collective model with which we began may seem unrealistic. A plausible
alternative is a household that achieves a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of consumption subject
to a series of information constraints. Husbands and wives operate separate enterprises. In
neighboring Ghana, there is direct evidence from surveys that spouses have poor information
about proﬁts from each others’ enterprises, and they also know little about each others’ private
consumption (Goldstein (2000)). Could our pattern of empirical results emerge from households
that achieve an eﬃcient allocation of resources subject to these information constraints?
In this context, if the researcher observed individual incomes, one would expect to see a
correlation between consumption (either private or publicly observed) and individual income:
Insurance should only be partial, as shown by the literature on insurance in the presence of
imperfect information (see, for example, Ligon (1998)). Note, however, that the exercise we
are carrying out here is diﬀerent: Since we are only using the part of income variation that is
predicted from rainfall realization, and the rainfall realization is observed by everybody in the
household, we are testing whether the household members are fully insuring themselves against
the observable part of income shocks. Prima facie, one would expect that the household members
can insure themselves against the observed part of income shocks even in an environment where
there is imperfect information (unless they do not know the model that links rainfall to their
partner’s income, which seems unlikely). That said, there may be circumstances where the
variance of the private income of a household member is correlated with the realization of the
observed shocks, which would lead the household to compensate her with more consumption.
The point is made most clearly with a very simple model. Income from individual i0s
enterprise depends on publicly-observed rainfall and on a shock that is private information:
fi(r)+εi. fi(r)i sd e ﬁned so that Ei(εi|r) = 0. The distribution of εi is deﬁned by the density
hi(εi|r).
Individual consumption (for simplicity, of a single good) is unobserved, but there can be an
observed net transfer of income t from the husband to the wife. An eﬃcient allocation within
28the household satisﬁes
max
ci,t Euf(cf)+λEum(cm)
subject to the household resource constraint
cf + cm ≤ ff(r)+εf + fm(r)+εm (26)
In addition to the standard non-negativity constrains, there are now two new incentive compat-
ibility constraints:
cf ∈ argmax
cf
Euf(cf)( 2 7 )
s.t.cf ≤ t + εf
cm ∈ argmax
cm
Eum(cm)( 2 8 )
s.t.cm ≤ fm(r)+εm + ff(r) − t
The accounting is arbitrary but without loss of generality for what follows. The female chooses
her consumption to maximize her utility subject to not spending more than her observed income
(t) plus her private income (εf), and the male does the same (his observed income is (fm(r)+
ff(r) − t) and his private income (εm). The constraints in (27) and (28) bind in any eﬃcient
allocation. Together they imply (26), so substituting we see that the eﬃcient allocation satisﬁes
max
t(r)
Euf(εf + t(r)) + λEum(fm(r)+ff(r)+εm − t(r)). (29)
An eﬃcient household chooses an allocation of observed income between the wife and husband
when rainfall r is realized to equalize the expected marginal utility of consumption between the
two:
Z ∂uf(εf + t(r))
∂c
hf(εf;r)dεf = λ
Z ∂um(fm(r)+fr(r)+εm − t(r))
∂c
hm(εm;r)dεm. (30)
Consider the analogue to our earlier result. Conditional on total observed household expenditure
(= fm(r)+fr(r)), does the observed expenditure on, say, the female private good (= t(r)) depend
on the rainfall realization?
In this model, the observed composition of consumption does not depend on rainfall realiza-
tions conditional on observed total expenditure, unless the distribution of unobserved income
29depends on rainfall. For example, if two distinct realizations of rainfall are associated with the
same observed expenditure, but the second involves higher variance of εf than the ﬁrst (but the
same variance of εm), then the net transfer from the husband to the wife will be higher in the
second.20
If there is a particular relationship between mean (observed) output for individual i and the
variance of i’s private output across rainfall realizations, then this eﬀect could underlie some
of the empirical regularities we observe. If “better” rainfall for i (in the sense that fi(r)i s
higher) is associated with higher variation in εi,t h e ni na ne ﬃcient allocation, higher observed
income to i is associated with higher observable expenditures by i conditional on total observed
expenditure.
While this cannot be tested directly (since we do not observe private income), it seems
unlikely that our patterns of results can be explained by this fact. We ﬁnd that increases in
female and male cash crop predicted income are associated with an expenditure towards adult
and prestige goods, and that increases in predicted yam income are associated with no increases
in this expenditure. To explain this pattern uniquely by an increase in the variance of individual
expenditures, the argument would require that the variance of εy decreases with rainfall that
increases fy(r), while the opposite pattern holds for female crops and other male crops. While
this pattern is possible, it seems less than likely.
A similar example can be constructed if moral hazard is the source of the imperfect infor-
mation (the household members cannot adequately monitor each other’s labor). Here again,
prima facie, the household members should still be able to insure each other against observable
shock. Diﬀerential individual consumption would arise only if higher output translated into
20Let ˆ r and ˜ r be such that fm(˜ r)+ff(˜ r)=fm(ˆ r)+ff(ˆ r) so that aggregate public resources are identical.
However, let hf(εf|ˆ r) be a mean preserving spread of hf(εf|˜ r), while hm(εm|˜ r)=hm(εm|ˆ r). Then if marginal
utility is convex and denoting the eﬃcient net transfers with rainfall ˜ r and ˆ r as t(˜ r)a n dt(ˆ r):
λ
Z
∂um(fm(˜ r)+fr(˜ r)+εm − t(ˆ r))
∂c
hm(εm|˜ r)=λ
Z
∂um(fm(ˆ r)+fr(ˆ r)+εm − t(ˆ r))
∂c
hm(εm|ˆ r)=
Z
∂uf(εf + t(ˆ r))
∂c
hf(εf;ˆ r)dεf >
Z
∂uf(εf + t(ˆ r))
∂c
hf(εf;˜ r)dεf.
So
λ
Z
∂um(fm(˜ r)+fr(˜ r)+εm − t(ˆ r))
∂c
hm(εm|˜ r) >
Z
∂uf(εf + t(ˆ r))
∂c
hf(εf;˜ r)dεf.
Therefore, t(˜ r) >t (ˆ r).
30higher variance of the required eﬀort. So to explain our results, it should be the case that while
higher cash crop predicted income translates into a higher variance of individual eﬀort by males,
whereas higher yam predicted income translates into a lower variance of individual eﬀort by
males. Again, it does not seem very likely.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that expenditure patterns in households in Cˆ o t ed ’ I v o i r ea r en o tc o n s i s t e n t
with a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of household resources. Moreover, the deviations from Pareto
eﬃciency that we document correspond closely to the descriptions of provisioning norms avail-
able in the literature. In particular, we ﬁnd that rainfall shocks that increase the output of
the “appreciated” crop, yam, are associated with strong shifts in the composition of expen-
ditures towards education, staples, and overall food consumption and away from adult goods
and “prestige” goods such as jewelry. In contrast, rainfall shocks that increase the output of
crops cultivated individually by either men or women are associated with strong expenditure
shifts toward adult and prestige goods. Shocks that increase the output of crops predominantly
cultivated by women shift expenditures toward all types of food consumption (except staples),
while similar shocks aﬀecting cash crops cultivated by men have no eﬀect on the purchases of
food. This result does not seem to be explained by changes in market prices or prices faced by
the household, and they are robust to several speciﬁcation checks: The assumption of linearity
of the demand functions seems veriﬁed in the data, the results do not seem to be explained
by non-separability between labor supply and consumption demands, nor do they arise from
diﬀerential changes in household composition as a response to these shocks.
The immediate implication of these results is that the conventional unitary household model
employed, for example, in the permanent income hypothesis is insuﬃciently rich to capture
important aspects of demand behavior. Nor does the more general collective model provide
an adequate framework for the interpretation of these results. Finally, because the variation
in this paper comes from observable (and common) rainfall shocks, these results are not easy
to reconcile with simple models of imperfect information (such as imperfect observation of the
output, consumption, or the inputs that went into production). A more radical departure from
31the conventional model is required.
One model that is consistent with our results on the diﬀerential impact of male cash crop and
female income is the model of informal insurance with limited commitment. In this model (Coate
and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and Ligon et al. (2002)), individuals cannot commit
to remain part of the informal insurance arrangement. In any single period, an individual who
received a high realization of income compares the short-term loss of remaining in the insurance
arrangement (the payment he must make to the common pool) and the long-term insurance gain.
As a result, perfect insurance is often not achievable, and individuals who receive high incomes
in a speciﬁc period consume more than others. This model has been recently proposed as a
model of insurance in the household by Ligon (2003). Note that in this setting, the household
cannot fully insure even against fully observable income shocks: It would thus explain why males
and females consume more of the goods they prefer when their own predicted income is bigger.
It is less direct to reconcile the model of limited commitment with our ﬁnding that expendi-
tures on food and education increase with yam predicted income. While the notional property
rights over yam income are attributed to men, yam, as an “appreciated product”, comes with
strings attached. Deviations from accepted use of this income can provoke strong punishment
from the community. Correspondingly, our results seem to imply that yam income is put into a
separate account, not fungible with the rest of male income, and spent on diﬀerent goods. The
norms that are so prominent in the discussions of household provisioning in West Africa appear
to have real consequences for the allocation of resources in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. We hypothesize that
this institution could have arisen as an endogenous response to the limited commitment problems
faced by the households. Faced with the consequences of these commitment problems, society
has constructed a new type of property right, such that the basic needs of the “household” can
be met with income ﬂows from the appreciated products. The social sanction associated with
deviation from the accepted use limits the enforcement problem for these income streams.
This suggests that a wide range of household outcomes could respond to changes in the
economic environment in ways that do not correspond to the predictions of simple collective
models. Decisions regarding investment in children’s human capital, production decisions, and
the allocation of land and other productive assets could all be aﬀected by ineﬃcient intra-
household negotiations and/or by constrained fungibility of resources across uses. For example,
32inter-temporal decisions such as the allocation of household resources into the human capital of
children could be aﬀected by the labelling of income if husbands and wives face diﬀerent oppor-
tunities in ﬁnancial markets. More generally, our results suggest that even when investigating
such core economical topics as demand analysis, economists may have much to learn from the
detailed observations available from neighboring disciplines. This is particularly so in a case
such as that of intra-household resource allocation in West Africa, where the broad contours of
the descriptions are at once so similar across many studies in a large number of local settings
and so strongly inconsistent with the routine models available to applied economists.
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37TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean, year 1 Difference in logs
1000's FCFA Year2-Year1 Observations
     Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3)
Income from male crops 553.78 -0.07 1025
(26.22) (.06)
Income from female crops 103.46 0.00 1025
(9.28) (0.10)
Total "male income" 593.89 -0.08 1025
(26.17) (0.06)
Total "female income" 143.58 0.06 1025
(10.21) (0.09)
Unattributed income 144.85 0.17 1025
(6.24) (0.12)
Total expenditure 1111.45 -0.10 1008
(28.41) (0.02)
Food consumption 639.37 -0.06 973
(12.68) (0.02)
Adult goods  45.67 -0.32 1025
(2.61) (0.12)
Clothing 263.92 -0.17 1025
(9.41) (0.06)
Prestige goods 218.11 -0.17 1025
(8.06) (0.07)
Staples 442.58 -0.03 1025
(12.32) (0.03)
Meat 142.72 -0.12 1025
(7.62) (0.04)
Vegetables 51.21 -0.07 1025
(2.67) (0.08)
Processed foods 41.15 -0.25 1025
(1.74) (0.04)
All purchased foods 309.86 -0.17 1020
(9.09) (0.03)
All food consumed at home 424.49 -0.06 1025
(13.78) (0.05)Table 2: First stage summary statistics
Male cash Yam  Female
crop income Income
(1) (2) (3)
F statistics
(p value)
All rainfall variables 1.99 3.50 2.53
are significant (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
Current year rainfall variables 1.18 3.38 2.43
significant (0.315) (0.000) (0.005)
Past year rainfall variables 2.79 4.64 2.64
significant (0.005) (0.000) (0.001)
Rainfall variables significantly 
different from: 
Male cash crop NA
2.10
Yam income  (0.010) NA
Female income 2.10 2.38 NA
(0.009) (0.002)
Note
(1) The full results are presented in Appendix, table 1
(2) The specification include year dummies, region dummies, 
and their interactions
Dependent variables
Current Table 3: unconstrained overidentification tests
Food 
consumption
Adult goods  Clothing
Prestige 
goods
Education Staples Meat Vegetables
Processed 
foods
Purchased 
foods
Food 
consumed 
at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
F test (p value) 3.16 2.21 3.22 3.25 1.56 3.04 1.90 1.92 3.33 5.95 2.04
Rainfall variables  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
jointly significant
F test (p value) 0.59 0.85 1.02 1.01 0.59 0.75 0.40 0.74 0.94 1.29 0.94
Test of overidentification (0.955) (0.681) (0.443) (0.453) (0.942) (0.823) (0.997) (0.833) (0.551) (0.150) (0.549)
restrictions 
Note: The second row presents the F statistics for a non-linear Wald Test of overidentification restriction that all year to year differences in rainfall variables affect year to year
differences in expenditures only through their impact on year to year  difference in total expenditure (see text, equation 19). The p value is shown in parentheses.
The regressions include year dummies, region dummies, and their interactions. 
Dependent variable: Change in log(item consumption)Table 4: Restricted overidentification tests
Total 
expenditure
Food 
consumption
Adult 
goods 
Clothing
Prestige 
goods
Education Staples Meat Vegetables
Processed 
foods
Purchased 
foods
Food 
consumed 
at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL A
OLS coefficients:
Predicted change in male non-yam 0.126 0.062 0.870 -0.164 0.683 -0.101 0.113 0.002 0.345 0.004 -0.029 0.098
income (0.049) (0.054) (0.425) (0.334) (0.209) (0.128) (0.072) (0.126) (0.210) (0.139) (0.078) (0.119)
Predicted change in yam 0.207 0.227 -0.473 0.296 -0.272 0.320 0.345 0.135 0.023 0.122 0.087 0.444
income (0.037) (0.041) (0.320) (0.252) (0.158) (0.108) (0.054) (0.096) (0.159) (0.105) (0.059) (0.090)
Predicted change in female  0.309 0.235 1.537 0.535 0.993 -0.098 0.193 0.492 0.995 0.474 0.412 0.313
income (0.056) (0.061) (0.490) (0.382) (0.239) (0.159) (0.082) (0.144) (0.239) (0.159) (0.089) (0.136)
F tests (p value) : 0.934 5.064 0.514 7.595 2.260 5.870 1.824 3.277 1.397 4.777 1.912
Overidentification (0.393) (0.007) (0.598) (0.001) (0.106) (0.003) (0.162) (0.038) (0.248) (0.009) (0.148)
Restriction test
PANEL B: LAGGED RAINFALL
OLS coefficients: 
Predicted change in  lagged male 0.073 0.039 0.350 0.044 0.047 0.091 0.038 0.150 0.039 0.115 0.155 -0.007
non-yam income (0.020) (0.022) (0.169) (0.133) (0.082) (0.056) (0.029) (0.050) (0.083) (0.055) (0.031) (0.047)
Predicted change in  lagged yam -0.003 0.004 0.008 -0.125 -0.076 -0.031 -0.021 0.015 0.011 0.027 0.024 -0.018
income (0.009) (0.009) (0.073) (0.059) (0.036) (0.029) (0.013) (0.022) (0.036) (0.024) (0.013) (0.021)
Predicted change in  lagged female  -0.001 0.018 -0.024 -0.251 -0.289 0.093 0.044 0.023 -0.054 -0.010 0.062 -0.035
income (0.026) (0.028) (0.220) (0.173) (0.107) (0.079) (0.038) (0.064) (0.107) (0.071) (0.040) (0.061)
F tests (p value) : 0.105 0.128 0.254 0.043 0.016 0.049 0.052 0.024 0.058 0.054 0.057
Overidentification (0.900) (0.880) (0.776) (0.958) (0.984) (0.952) (0.949) (0.976) (0.943) (0.948) (0.945)
Restriction test
Note: The table presents the OLS coefficient of the difference in log consumption of each item on the difference in predicted log income (obtained from the equation presented in 
table A1). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regressions include year dummies, region dummies, and their interactions.
The overidentification test is a non-linear wald test for the hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression are proportional
to their coefficients in column (1)
Dependent variable: Change in log (item consumption)Table 5 : Relationship between predicted income shocks and local prices
beef imported  local rice onion salt tomato  peanut palm oil local maize local millet
rice paste butter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
predicted change in male non-yam  0.09 -0.19 -0.04 0.32 -0.23 -0.07 0.23 0.44 0.36 -0.01
income (0.126) (0.134) (0.157) (0.189) (0.195) (0.064) (0.288) (0.246) (0.214) (0.103)
predicted change in  yam income 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.09
(0.047) (0.050) (0.058) (0.070) (0.073) (0.024) (0.107) (0.091) (0.079) (0.038)
predicted change in female income 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.02 -0.23 0.10 -0.50 0.53 -0.06 -0.01
(0.158) (0.168) (0.197) (0.237) (0.245) (0.080) (0.362) (0.308) (0.268) (0.129)
F statistics: predicted 
income variables jointly 0.33 1.04 0.46 1.04 0.71 1.23 1.05 2.80 1.08 1.76
significant (p-value) (0.80) (0.38) (0.71) (0.39) (0.55) (0.31) (0.38) (0.05) (0.36) (0.17)
cassava yams plantain oil palm  peanuts eggs cloth fish sandals enamel
nuts bowl
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
predicted change male non-yam 
income -0.27 0.40 0.26 -0.14 0.34 -0.15 0.34 0.05 -0.04 0.18
(0.250) (0.225) (0.320) (0.213) (0.192) (0.220) (0.212) (0.147) (0.141) (0.222)
predicted change in yam income -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.07
(0.093) (0.084) (0.119) (0.079) (0.071) (0.082) (0.079) (0.055) (0.052) (0.082)
predicted change in  female income -0.10 -0.05 -0.31 0.09 -0.12 -0.46 0.23 -0.19 0.40 0.19
(0.314) (0.283) (0.402) (0.267) (0.240) (0.276) (0.266) (0.185) (0.176) (0.278)
F statistics: predicted  0.41 1.18 0.65 0.23 1.40 1.06 1.20 0.58 2.53 0.50
income variables jointly (0.75) (0.33) (0.58) (0.87) (0.26) (0.38) (0.32) (0.63) (0.07) (0.69)
significant (p-value)
Note: item prices are obtained in the market for each enumeration area.   The regressions include year dummies, region dummies, and their interactions.
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: change in  log(item price)Table 6: Restricted overidentification tests, labor supply
Total 
expenditure
hours worked, 
men
hours worked, 
women
hours worked in 
agriculture, men
hours worked in 
agriculture, 
women
hours work, non 
agriculture, men
hours work, non 
agriculture, 
women
amount 
spent on 
paid labor 
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicted male non-yam 0.126 0.187 0.070 0.160 0.085 0.315 0.177 -0.927
income (0.049) (0.140) (0.142) (0.177) (0.186) (0.207) (0.204) (0.586)
Predicted yam 0.207 0.167 0.163 0.076 0.181 -0.119 -0.089 -0.341
income (0.037) (0.106) (0.108) (0.134) (0.140) (0.157) (0.154) (0.444)
Predicted female  0.309 0.200 0.239 0.413 0.280 0.307 -0.031 -1.205
income (0.056) (0.160) (0.162) (0.202) (0.212) (0.236) (0.233) (0.669)
F tests (p value): 0.228 0.020 0.486 0.013 1.422 0.483 0.467
Overidentification (0.797) (0.980) (0.615) (0.988) (0.242) (0.617) (0.627)
Restriction test
Note: The table presents the OLS coefficient of difference in log(hours) for each type of labor supply on difference in predicted log income (obtained from the 
equation presented in  table A1). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regressions include year dummies, regions dummies, and their interactions.
The overidentification test is a non-linear wald test for the hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression are proportional
to their coefficient in column (1)
Dependent variable: Change in log (labor supply)Table 7: Restricted overidentification tests: family composition
total Family 
expenditure size male female male female male female male female male female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (9) (10) (11)
male non yams 0.126 0.311 0.174 -0.192 0.129 0.316 -0.144 -0.050 0.070 0.118 0.034 0.080
(0.049) (0.243) (0.125) (0.131) (0.171) (0.217) (0.156) (0.138) (0.083) (0.089) (0.095) (0.116)
Yam 0.207 0.504 0.190 0.058 -0.010 0.212 0.106 -0.099 0.210 0.110 -0.004 -0.152
(0.037) (0.184) (0.094) (0.100) (0.134) (0.170) (0.117) (0.115) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.088)
female 0.309 0.843 0.106 -0.005 0.468 0.674 0.192 0.168 0.136 0.190 0.093 -0.066
(0.056) (0.278) (0.144) (0.144) (0.203) (0.241) (0.187) (0.180) (0.096) (0.100) (0.106) (0.141)
F tests (p value): 0.028 0.950 0.880 0.942 0.173 0.899 0.668 1.139 0.110 0.257 1.448
Overidentification (0.973) (0.387) (0.416) (0.391) (0.841) (0.408) (0.514) (0.321) (0.896) (0.774) (0.237)
Restriction test
Note: The table present the OLS coefficient of difference the number of household members on difference in predicted log income (obtained from the 
equation presented in  table A1). Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The regression include year dummies, region dummies, and their interactions.
The overidentification test is a non-linear wald test for the hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression are proportional
to their coefficient in column (1)
Dependent variable: Change in the numbers of household members in each category
Older adults >60 Infants 0-4 Children 5-14 Teenagers 15-19 Prime age 20-60Appendix Table A1: First stage regression results
Forest  Savannah Forest Savannah Forest Savannah
coefficients interaction coefficients interaction coefficients interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Difference (year 2 - year 1) in:
Aggregate rainfall current year, season 1 -0.0015175 0.0040317 0.0004811 -0.003153 -0.010761
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Aggregate rainfall current year, season 2 0.0007268 0.0013814 -0.001099 0.0015603 0.0015827
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Aggregate rainfall current year, season 3 -0.0006134 0.0038313 0.0001552 -0.002321 -0.003099
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Aggregate rainfall current year, season 4 0.0007069 -0.0042 -0.000169 0.0005378 -0.006442
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Aggregate rainfall past year, season 1 -0.0003565 0.0068233 -0.004016 -0.00618 -0.010605
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Aggregate rainfall past year, season 2 0.0000808 -0.006707 0.0008669 0.0023795 -0.000265
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Aggregate rainfall past year, season 3 -0.00138 0.0033809 -9.57E-05 -0.00226 0.0027378
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aggregate rainfall past year, season 4 -0.0007686 -0.003408 0.0014161 0.0007269 0.0053683
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Dummy for shock, current year, season 1 -0.476418 -0.093278 -0.894238
(0.233) (0.364) (0.439)
Dummy for shock, current year, season 2 0.4592265 0.3583756 0.127267 0.4623188 -2.75326
(0.193) (0.485) (0.300) (0.283) (0.828)
Dummy for shock, current year, season 3
Dummy for shock, current year, season 4 -0.4114966 0.6722299 -2.134331
(0.378) (0.654) (0.520)
Dummy for shock, past year, season 1 0.2208379 -0.023197 0.1107528 0.2016122 3.537023
(0.208) (0.531) (0.362) (0.262) 1.107312
Dummy for shock, past year, season 2 -0.0744996 0.1403303 -0.037784 -0.133787 -2.962664
(0.119) (0.429) (0.183) (0.204) 0.9110861
Dummy for shock, past year, season 3 -0.3152398 0.5705816 -1.324416 -0.124188 -3.387585
(0.245) (1.027) (0.384) (0.386) 1.388615
Dummy for shock, past year, season 4 -0.7206122 0.4587139 0.7792504 -1.748257 1.238107
(0.267) (1.366) (0.437) (0.408) 1.274639
Number of observations  976 614 607
Note: the specifications also include year dummies, region dummies, and their interactions
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figs. 1i-k: Partial Linear Expenditure Functions
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Figs. 2a-d: Partial Linear Expenditure Functions
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Figs. 2e-h: Partial Linear Expenditure Functions
+/- 2 std. dev. pointwise confidence intervals
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Figs. 2i-k: Partial Linear Expenditure Functions
+/- 2 std. dev. pointwise confidence intervals
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